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Abstract 
 
For how long does cultural heritage persist? Do the culturally inherited values of immigrants dilute as 
generations pass?  We answer these question by studying the relationship between revealed  political 
behavior of immigrant families and the culture of the place where they migrated from, either one or 
many generations ago. Using surnames as indicators of region of origin of Italians in Venezuela, we 
study the effect of cultural heritage on two indicators of revealed political behavior: (i) propensity for 
civic engagement, and (ii) propensity for redistribution.  A well established literature documents 
greater propensity for civic engagement and lower propensity for redistribution among Northern 
Italians.  In Venezuela, we measure the former by turnout before the era of political polarization and 
the latter by signing behavior against Hugo Chávez in the 2004 recall referendum drive.  Despite the 
fact that the wave of Italian immigration to Venezuela occurred more than half a century before the 
events studied in this paper, we do not find a greater propensity for civic engagement nor preference 
against redistribution among descendants from Northern as opposed to Southern Italians, suggesting 
that cultural assimilation may be a strong determinant of political behavior in the long run. 
 
Keywords: Social capital, political incorporation of immigrants, family economics, redistribution, 
political preferences, civic engagement, Latin America. 
JEL Classification:  Z1, F22, P26. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
Culture is often believed to be a significant determinant of political behavior.  The idea that 
differences in culture will lead to different political preferences has often been used as an 
argument to create selective immigration regimes which restrict immigration from 
“different” countries, and the postulate that immigrants will affect the political equilibrium 
is taken as given in many political economy models of immigration.1  However, relatively 
little evidence exists on the importance and durability of these perceived effects. 
 
This paper estimates whether cultural heritage has an effect on political behavior.  Tackling 
this issue provides us with a set of significant empirical challenges.  In order to distinguish 
cultural heritage from personal experience in the source area, it is necessary to concentrate 
on immigrants of second or higher immigration, though most data on political behavior only 
contain information on the place of birth of the respondent and thus only allow us to study 
first-generation immigrants.   In order to distinguish the effect of culture from the different 
opportunities sets available to immigrants from different places – and abstract, for example, 
from the effects of discrimination – we need to use populations of immigrants which can be 
argued to have distinct cultural heritages but which are also treated similarly by the host 
country population.  Furthermore, while a declaration of political preference is informative, 
ideally we would want to know whether culture affects political behavior (i.e., what voters 
do instead of what they say they would prefer to do). 
 
Data on the political behavior of Italian migrants to Venezuela allows us to tackle all of 
these issues simultaneously.  First, the wave of Italian immigration to Venezuela occurred 
during the 1950s and 1960s, so that the group of people with Italian surnames in Venezuela 
is made up of predominantly second or higher generation immigrants.  Second, since Italian 
immigrants from different regions spoke the same language and had the same religion, they 
were not exposed to significantly different treatment by Venezuelan natives.  Third, recent 
data from Venezuela offers measures of revealed political behavior identified by surname, 
                                                 
1 Barriers to immigration are also justified on the basis of concerns about the efficiency or distributive effects 
of immigrants on the home economy, as well as due to the more diffuse effects that they may have on “social 
cohesion” (Benhabib, 1996; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Countries in the Persian Gulf have sued this ‘like-
minded” argument to justify differential migration policies. Another alternative is to avoid giving political 
rights to migrants, like in short term programs. One example, with its own problems, was the “Bracero” 
Program (1942-1964) implemented in the US (Calavita, 1992). See Mayda (2006) on how having similar 
culture shapes the attitudes of domestic voters over immigration 
and thus susceptible of being linked to cultural heritage among second and higher 
generation immigrants, namely the measures of voting turnout and signatures of recall 
referendum petitions captured in the Maisanta database (Hsieh et. al., 2008). 
 
Most importantly, the distinction between Italians according to their regions of origin 
allows us to have as good a measure as possible of political cultural heritage.  Foundational 
papers in the study of social capital and culture have documented the significant differences 
between Northern and Southern Italy (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1983).2  If we wanted to find 
two groups within a nation for which we would expect cultural differences to be strong 
enough so as to persist over time, we would be hard pressed to find a better example than 
that of Northern and Southern Italian immigrants 
 
The idea that culture affects economic and political behavior goes back at least to Weber 
(1905). Recently these ideas have been tested econometrically with the use of large micro-
level data on immigrants. Using the Current Population Survey, Bueker (2005) has shown 
that country of origin explains naturalization and turnout among US immigrants. However, 
his work covers only first generation migrants, where the effects of culture are strongly 
confounded with those of experiences in the source country before emigrating. 
 
Another strand of the literature uses stated preferences and tries to distinguish the role of 
culture from other factors. The most frequent3 approach can be exemplified by Wust (2000), 
who crosses party preferences and place of birth to look for differences among different 
source countries. Again, the work covers only first generation migrants and cannot 
distinguish common pre-emigration experience from cultural heritage. 
 
Luttmer and Singhal (2008) try to tell apart culture in determining preferences for 
redistribution by studying the preferences of first generation European immigrants to other 
                                                 
2 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007) claim that the medieval experience of independence seems a crucial 
factor underlying the development of social capital. This can even explain variation in trust within the North 
of Italy 
3 Surveys about political preferences pervade the spectrum of both political science and electoral research. 
However, this research is much more interested in the descriptive statistics and the use for pragmatic 
forecasting of voting and targeting than to explore causality. 
European countries. Their results show that part of the stated preferences over redistribution 
of an Italian living in Germany can be explained by the average preferences of other Italians 
in Italy, over and above what can be explained by usual covariates. Their data covers first 
generation migrants to countries that are geographically very close to the sending country. 
So, again, it is uninformative about intergenerational persistence. 
 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) come closer to our work by exploiting the episode of 
German reunification to show that former East Germans ended up having a higher 
preference for redistribution after half a century of living in a communist regime4. Their 
identification strategy controls for historical events previous to World War II, dealing with 
concerns on pre- existing differences among groups. Because we are looking at events that 
occurred in the much more distant past, our paper can be seen as exploring the long-run 
persistence of this type of cultural differences on revealed political behavior.  
 
Other attempts have looked at longer term effects by going beyond the first generation. 
Alesina and Giuliano (2007) show how families from cultures with strong family ties tend 
to rely more on these ties and less on markets and governments as sources of income and 
social insurance. Some other studies concentrate on the behavior of second generation 
migrants5. However, these studies rely on cross-national differences and thus cannot control 
for differences in treatment at the host country of people with different nationalities 
(differential discrimination). 
  
Our paper builds on this literature in a number of dimensions. First, we are looking at the 
effect of culture on political values half a century after the wave of migration.  Thus our 
estimates allow us to evaluate theories that predict stickiness of culture over time (Bisin & 
Verdier, 2002; Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Tabellini, 2008). Second, we use as input one of 
                                                 
4 Their main point was not persistence but documenting that there was a significant change in preferences 
assuming that the actual position of the border had nothing to do with original preferences for redistribution 
5  Giuliano (2007) shows that the decision to live with the family or to leave the parents’ nest is influenced by 
the country of origin in a persistent way. She claims it is mediated by culture because, among other things, the 
living arrangements of second generation migrants in the United States somehow mimics the patterns lived in 
their countries of origin. Fernandez and Fogli (2009) follow the fertility decisions of women from different 
ancestries in the United States finding that the average fertility in the country of origin is a statistically 
significant predictor of fertility in the US. 
the few large examples where revealed, active and costly political action can be traced back 
to people with name and surname. It contrasts with survey approaches where people were 
merely asked what they think about redistribution6. Third, by focusing on a single country 
pair, we can separate cultural heritage from observable characteristics that may trigger 
differences in treatment, such as religion and language. 78  
 
Most previous papers find significant cultural effects9. In contrast, we find that the well 
documented higher propensity for civic engagement (Putnam, 1993) and lower preference 
for redistribution (Bavetta, 2008) among Northern relative to Southern Italians does not 
translate to Venezuelan citizens with Italian ancestry. A possible explanation for our results, 
which we do not tackle at the current stage, is that differential within region self selection is 
playing a major role, leading pro-redistribution, non-civically engaged Northern Italians and 
anti-redistribution, more civically engaged Northern Italians to emigrate to Venezuela.  
While this is certainly a possibility, we find no indication that anything about the 
Venezuelan selection process for immigration (which essentially welcomed all Italians) nor 
the Italian selection process for emigration could have generated this type of bias. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a basic framework. Section 
3 explores the context of Italian Migration to the Americas, focusing on Venezuela as a 
recipient country. Section 4 explains the data and our estimation technique, with a strong 
emphasis on explaining how to trace back Italian surnames into regions. Section 5 shows 
                                                 
6 This is the largely discussed difference between actual choice and contingent valuation in Economics. 
7 Our paper has similarities with other attempts to unveil propensity for civic engagement from country fixed 
effects   See Fisman, Ray and Edward Miguel. “Cultures of Corruption: Evidence from Diplomats’ Parking 
Violations,” 2006.  
8 These authors focus on documenting the link with corruption in their countries of origin. However, it seems 
more reasonable to connect it to their propensity for civic engagement, since it was not against the law avoid 
these payments 
9  One exception, in a different problem, has been Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994). They find that savings rate 
among immigrants in Canada are unrelated to their country. The same authors (1999) used immigrants to the 
US and found differences among countries of origin. Nonetheless, they discarded cultural factors because 
“saving patterns of immigrants do not resemble the national saving patterns of their countries of origin”. 
Indeed, people coming from Asian countries with high savings rate – like Korea, Japan or Taiwan – do not 
show particularly high savings in the United States when compared to other countries. This result is in the 
flavor of what we argue in this paper: if there are differences among Venezuelans of different regions of 
Origin, they do not resemble the original ranking in Italy 
the results of the estimation and discusses them. Finally, section 6 presents some concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
1. Framework for empirics 
 
Recent theoretical work has attempted to integrate culture within rational theories of 
decision-making. In general, these contributions treat culture as a bequested preference 
parameter, making intergenerationally altruistic parents the key ingredient to rationalize 
culture (Bisin & Verdier, 2002; Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Tabellini, 2008).  In a reduced 
form, these theories predict a sticky law of motion for culture, 
 
  ittparents1-t1-t1-itit XEX *  AdaptCultureCulture  
 
,where itCulture  represents a preference parameter for members of family i’s  generation 
number t. This preference parameter can be interpreted as a preference for a given type of 
choice, over and above the effect of other economic determinants. Similarly, 1-tCulture  
represents the same parameter for the parental generation.  The ratio between the two is the 
effect of indoctrination made by parents. Adapt(.) is an adaptation function that takes into 
account expectations of changes between the environment where parents lived ( 1-tX ) and 
the one where their kids will do as adults ( tX ).  We assume   0.' Adapt  and 
  00 Adapt   
 
Following Tabellini (2008), the relevant environments for the creation of past culture are 
places where most of the transactions –either economic or not – took place in the far past. 
We will proxy these places by the (sub-national) region of origin in Italy. For generations 
before migration, Tt  , we assume that people lived in a stationary environment where 
rational expectations imply   region01-ttparentst XXXE  . Thus, we can recover the baseline 
cultural preference in a region as regionregion CultureCulture 0Tt   
 In this paper we are interested in the average ratio of these preferences between two groups 
after immigration. After a period t-T from migration, the ratio can be expressed as 
 
tB
A
B
A
Culture
Culture
Culture
Culture  *
0
0
t
t



  
 
with the cumulative relative adaptation factor being 
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Since we do not observe culture directly, we will interpret as a measure of culture the 
coefficient of a region of origin fixed effect, over and above what other standard 
determinants of civic engagement and preference for redistribution.  The core question we 
will ask is whether adaptation is slow enough as to allow distinguishing a difference in 
these “regional effects” 
Assuming that the adaptation function is the same for both groups10, we have two testable 
hypotheses - conditional on receiving the same set of opportunities and choices, one for 
civic engagement and the other for redistribution-related voting. These are built under the 
null that adaptation effect is small enough.   
 
 
Hypothesis 1: [Propensity for civic engagement rank]  Let tjC  be the average propensity 
for civic engagement (propensity to vote) for a group cultural origin j. If   000  BA CC  
then   0tt  BA CC  for t > T.  The ranking in the average propensity for civic 
engagement of two groups remains constant after migration.  
 
Similarly, following the idea that cultural origin shapes the attitudes towards redistribution11  
                                                 
10 With an equal adaptation function for both countries, arguably the group with larger difference between 
their options in Italy and in Venezuela would adapt faster, moving the ratio of cultural preferences   towards 
one.  
11 See for example Tabellini, 2008b; Luttmer & Shingal, 2008 
 Hypothesis 2: [Redistribution rank]  Let tjR  be the average propensity to vote against 
redistribution for a group with cultural origin j. If   000  BA RR  then   0tt  BA RR  
for t > T.  The ranking in the average propensity to vote against redistribution of two 
regions remains constant after migration.  
 
Note that both hypotheses are written as strict inequalities, so they can be rejected if the 
difference in cultural propensities becomes zero or switches sign12 
 
Interestingly, our case of Italians in Venezuela provides a reasonable control for many 
features to test the above hypothesis and implicitly estimate the magnitude of the adaptation 
coefficient t . First, in contrast to, say, Asian and Latino immigrants in the United States, 
Northern and Southern Italian immigrants had arguably similar opportunity sets in 
Venezuela, thus    tB1-ttA1-t XEXE  . Also, the timing of migration is relatively 
concentrated,  making more plausible the idea of comparing groups after a common 
migration time T. Additionally, to identify the cultural preferences we will work with a very 
controlled choice set: going to the ballot box in 2000 (or not) and signing against the 
incumbent President in 2004 (or not).  
 
 
2. Understanding the context 
 
2.1. Italians in Venezuela 
 
There are many reasons making the wave of Italian immigration to Venezuela an interesting 
case for our empirical implementation.   First, the enormous heterogeneity in people’s 
ability to pursue collective action and economic activity and its link to region of origin has 
been well documented in the literature (e.g., Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993).  Second, 
the massive numbers of Italian emigration to countries in the Americas imply that it is 
                                                 
12 Like in Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999), where savings switches sign across groups 
possible to get statistically relevant quantities for analysis. Moreover, Italian migration to 
Venezuela was very concentrated in two decades in the middle of the XX century, reducing 
the potential confusion emanating from different cohorts of migration  
 
Additionally, cultural heterogeneity of Italians does not reflect in language or religion. 
Although Italians had regional dialects, they did have a national language13. Similarly, 
almost all Italians were Roman Catholic. We can thus be reasonably confident that our 
estimated differences will have originated in the local environment (e.g. Putnam et al, 1993) 
and not, say, in differences in religious principles or in treatment of observably different 
persons.   
 
Furthermore, Italians seem to have had limited residential mobility for centuries, making 
local culture strongly dependant on the local environment.  Even today there is a strong 
tendency in Italy to live close where parents live; more than in the US and other European 
countries (see Bordignon el at, 2006). Finally, Italy is a good source of surnames because 
different regions had different ways to mix concepts to build surnames14 (see also Cavalli-
Sforza et al 2004).  This feature helps us trace back people to regions without losing too 
much power in the attempt. 
 
 
2.2. The Migration Wave: roughly 1940 to 1965 
 
Unlike many other countries in The Americas, which received relevant Italian populations 
even before 1900, Italian migration to Venezuela was quite low until the middle of the XX 
century. As shown in Figure 1 (note the logarithmic scale), the big jump in Italian inflow to 
                                                 
13  Italians descendants in Venezuela do not seem so different in terms of observables when one split them by 
region origin. Moreover, we did not find any evidence of differential discrimination across Italian groups by 
Venezuelans. Different sources cite Italian migration as a contribution to the county’s stock of human capital. 
See Cunill (1996); Iannettone 2003; D'Angelo 2005.   
14  Similarly, the creation of these surnames was more or less in the right timing for our purposes in Italy, 
because we can still observe the heterogeneity in surnames. Family names in Korea and China were created 
many centuries ago but now a large fraction of the population holds the same surnames. This is just a result of 
mechanics of mating and the passage of time in the so called Galton-Watson decay process. In contrast, the 
Netherlands uses surnames only since the early XIX century and, for a small country, they have more than 60 
thousand surnames. 
Venezuela happened after World War II and lasted until the late 1950s. Before 1941 there 
were less than 3 thousand people that reported being born in Italy. Twenty years later the 
census figures are forty times larger. This concentration in the arrival date is important for 
our purposes; it helps to avoid confounding our estimates of persistence with differential 
timings of migration.  The migration spike lasted until roughly 1965. As shown both by the 
Census (Fig. 1) and the 2003 household survey (Figure 2), the arrival of Italian born citizens 
severely declined after 1965. Given that some of the migrants in the 1950s may have died 
by 2003, the actual decrease in the flow of immigrants is likely to be understated by the 
graph. In short, even if people migrated in other moments, we have arguably one 
concentrated window of migration between the 1940s and 1965.   
 
Figure 1. People born in Italy recorded in the National Venezuelan Censuses. Source: 
Author’s calculation based on the compilation of Cunill, 1996. 
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Figure 2. Year of arrival to Venezuela of Italian born answering the 2003 Venezuelan 
household survey. Non weighted histogram. 
 
Both political and economic factors seem to rationalize the sudden interest of Italians for 
Venezuela. On the one hand, at the time of the World Wars Venezuela had grown 
enormously due to an influx of oil revenues (Rodríguez 2008; Rodríguez and Gomolin, 
2008) precisely in a moment when the Italian economy was devastated. In 1960, per capita 
income in Venezuela was almost as high as in the United States (Figure 3).  On the other 
hand, the military government of Venezuela was proactively looking for European Italian 
migration in the post war period, under the belief that immigration from Europe would 
improve Venezuelan culture. 
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Figure 3. Output per capita in Venezuela and Italy (log scale) between 1860 and 2000. 
Measured  in GK Dollars of 1990. GDP for USA and well as the years 1919 and 1945 were 
included in shade as benchmark. Note that Venezuelan growth rate was very fast in the 
middle of the XX century, with a second acceleration towards the end of WW II coinciding 
with the highest inflow of Italian immigrants.  Note also the Italian postwar collapse and the 
subsequent recovery. Source: Author’s calculations based on Angus Maddison’s database of 
historical GDP. 
 
The reported stock of Italian born citizens in Venezuela is certainly not the same as the 
number of Italian descendants living in the country. Generations migrated before 1940 had 
the opportunity to have many more kids and grandkids in Venezuela, which were not 
recorded as Italian born in the census, but which appear in our methodology. Even if we 
cannot discard some differential in the dates of arrival to the country, this episode of Italian 
migration to Venezuela seems likely to one of the most concentrated examples available.   
 
 
2.3. Venezuelan politics in the era of Twenty-First Century Socialism. 
 
Venezuela’s political context also gives an interesting setting for our analysis.  After the 
arrival of Hugo Chávez to power in 1999, his government has progressively moved towards 
a regime with strong state control in almost every economic activity.  The regime, labeled 
by Chávez one of “Twenty-First Century Socialism”, benefited from a large increase in oil 
prices to bolster political support, at the cost of high polarization (see Rodriguez, 2008; 
Corrales, 2007). Recent estimates show large productivity and resource allocation losses 
due to political conflict (Hsieh, Miguel, Ortega and Rodríguez, 2008). 
 
The Venezuelan Constitution, approved in 1999, allowed a referendum to recall the 
President to take place conditional on the collection of signatures from more than 20% of 
the voting population. The complete names of all signers were later published by pro-
government legislator Luis Tascón, with the explicit support of the Chávez administration.  
This data set allows us to have unique information linking revealed political behavior to 
individual names and surnames. 
  
Some caveats, however, must be mentioned with respect to the use of this data. 
 
First, some Venezuelan residents with Italian passport may have left the country before the 
signature process took place, and thus may still appear as registered to vote even if they 
actually never had the option of signing the petition, in spite of being the ones that dislike 
the regime the most.  Although this would be a violation of the assumption of a constant 
choice set15, if the propensity to leave the country is constant across regions it should not 
affect our results.  
  
Second, people may not have full incentives to truthfully reveal these preferences. Unlike in 
a vote with secret ballot, here the President himself clarified that every single person 
signing the petition would be identified. Hsieh et al. (2008) find that the cost from signing 
the petition was as high as 4 percent of pre-signing income, mostly caused by lower 
probability of public sector employment. We thus interpret the signature as political 
behavior rather than deep preference. 
 
                                                 
15 There are even websites specialized in finding the “lost grandparent” that will get you access to Italy, and 
more importantly, to the entire European Union. 
In any case, these two criticisms are less of a problem when looking at civic engagement, 
because our turnout data is from political participation in elections previous to the year 
2000, when polarization was significantly smaller. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
3.1. Data  
 
To follow our families of interest we used three types of data: (i) records of the political and 
economic behavior of people in Venezuela, including their surnames; (ii) data of average 
characteristics in Italian regions and; (iii) a mapping from surnames to regions in Italy. 
 
Venezuelan data comes from the Maisanta list and the Venezuelan Social Security 
database. The Maisanta list16 indicates name, surname and national ID for people in voting 
age population. It also lists the signers of a petition against Hugo Chavez in 2004 as well as 
their turnout in elections previous to the year 2000. This list was used to punish people that 
voted against the regime, which is the main focus of Hsieh et al (2008), as well as to target 
political supporters during the campaign for the 2004 recall referendum.  Venezuela’s 
Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (www.ivss.gov.ve) lists the income history of 
4 million Venezuelans working in the formal sector identified by their national ID and date 
of birth, which are public information available in the National Electoral Registry.17 
 
To trace people back to Italian region we used the database compiled in the site 
Indettaglio.it , kindly shared at a regional level by its administrator.  This database was built 
using current Italian population in each geographic location. As robustness check for our 
surnames, we used a US commercial list of ethnic origins of surnames at a national level. 
 
                                                 
16 See Hsieh, Miguel, Ortega, Rodriguez (2008) for further description 
17 At the best of our knowledge, our paper seems to be the first at using this detailed dataset. 
Finally, Italian regional data is much more standard. Stated preferences come from the 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 1990. GDP and population are from 
EUROSTAT. 
 
3.2. How do we trace back people into Italian regions? 
 
Each person is assigned to Italian region r if the following two conditions hold. First, the 
frequency of her surname in that region today, riS , should be at least 70% of the overall 
frequency of that surname in Italy. Second, to avoid infrequent surnames, we required that 
at least 100 people should have that surname in Italy. If any of these two conditions fails, 
the individual is removed from the sample.18 
 


  
                                                           if     empty            
 100Sand 7.0)S/(S if        
Region j
i
j
ii
i
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r jjr
 
 
This procedure gets rid of common surnames that are all over the place in Italy (e.g. Rossi, 
Russo, Ferrari, Esposito, Bianchi, Romano, Colombo…), creating a one to one mapping 
between one of 20,460 surnames and one of the twenty Italian regions. When merged with 
surnames in Venezuela, we get a sample of roughly 120 thousand people.  
 
Some surnames with Italian origin also are widespread in Spain. This can make a surname 
common in Venezuela in spite of not being an indication of Italian heritage.  To address this 
concern we use two additional filters. One is to delete these common Spanish surnames 
using local criteria. This is not that controversial because of the well known large frequency 
of some of these surnames. In the appendix we provide a list of the surnames we discarded. 
38,077 observations survive this filter. Of them, 13,431 can be matched with the Social 
Security Data to get employment and (censored) income 
  
                                                 
18 An alternative would be to build the probability that your parents came from region r. We expect to do this 
in extensions of this paper 
As a robustness check we also used a commercial database of Italian surnames19 (without 
regional classification).  This was an alternative way to avoid non Italian surnames in our 
match. From our subsample of 120 thousand, only 20 thousand survived to this filter. 
 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows some basic summary statistics, which are already indicative of our main 
result. There seems to be no support for the idea that descendants from Northern Italy have 
either higher income, propensity for civic engagement, or propensity to oppose 
redistribution in our sample. 
 
For example, abstention from turnout in elections shows no statistical differences across 
regions. If any, the abstention proportion estimates are lower for surnames coming from 
Southern Italian regions. This is completely opposite to what one would expect based on the 
well documented trend of the civic engagement in the Northern regions (e.g. Putnam, 1993). 
Income and employment differences are also minor among groups of regions, without any 
clear North versus South pattern. With the exception of subpopulation (2) we do not 
observe major differences in petition signature against Chavez in 2004. In subpopulation 
(2), representing those from the Northeast Italian region, we do see a higher prevalence of 
petition signing, but the small size of the regional subpopulation makes the estimate 
imprecise and not significant. If any, the Northwest more than compensates against it, 
leaving the Northern average slightly below the rest.   
 
 
To check that the quality of the match between electoral data and social security data is 
reasonable we compute the main descriptive statistics in Table 2. The only important yet 
small difference appears to be in the average age. However, this is what one would expect 
as some young people may be of voting age population yet not enrolled in the social 
security administration. In any case, the difference is quite small (one year); below we run 
the regressions using age controls. 
                                                 
19 Melissa ( c ) 
  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: by groups of Italian regions of origin and type of sample.  Population 
(1) only eliminates dead persons and obvious Spanish surnames. Subpopulation (2) includes the same 
variables as (1) plus the US commercial list. Subpopulation  (3) is as (1) but only gets one random 
person per surname. Gender and worker status is available only for the match with social security. 
 
Table 2: Assessing the quality of the match with social security data. 
4. Estimation 
 
We first explore differences in propensity for civic engagement, proxied by electoral 
participation before the era of high political polarization in Venezuela (circa 2000). Table 3 
presents a horserace of regressions that, in the spirit of Proposition 1, look for differences in 
levels of electoral abstention between the North and the South of Italy.  A priori, one would 
expect to see higher rates of participation among the more civic-minded Northerners. 
 
As shown in Table 3, we found no results supporting this story, even after controlling age, 
age squared and gender. Indeed, the Italian zones included in the regression appear between 
0 and 5% more likely to avoid turnout than the South, which is the omitted category. 
Moreover, when we add earned income, we continue not finding regional effects in favor of 
higher participation for Venezuelans coming from Northern Italy. All three different 
samples used (as noted in the head of each column) show a consistent result that does not go 
away after controlling for income.  
 
Another piece of evidence against a direct relationship between propensity for civic 
engagement of Italian descendants in Venezuelans and the average propensity for civic 
engagement in the region of origin is provided in Figure 4. Italian regions where there is 
lower propensity for civic engagement, as measured by the willingness to sign a petition, 
are associated with higher turnout in Venezuela (lower abstention). Again, we get a result 
that does not mirror the Italian situation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Linear probability regression of electoral abstention (no turnout circa year 2000) of 
Venezuelans on Italian regional origin and controls. Standard errors clustered at the level of 
Italian Region (rather than groups of region indicated in the regression). 
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Figure 4.  Proportion of abstention in Venezuelan election plotted against indicator of (low) 
propensity for civic engagement in the region of origin: Proportion saying that they will 
never sign a petition in Italy (1990). Source: Author’s calculation based on Maisanta 
database with Italian Surnames and European Value Survey 1990. 
 
Thus, our analysis so far provides no support for hypothesis 1, which predicted constant 
rank of propensity for civic engagement across groups. The people that crossed the Atlantic 
and arrived at Venezuela in the mid of the XX century seem to have a different behavior 
from the average in their regions of origin.  
 
The next natural step is to make a similar exercise, but explore the “preferences for populist 
redistribution”. Table 4 shows that petition signature against the Government of President 
Chavez in 2004 does follow a similar pattern.   Once we control for income, there is no 
difference among Italian zones of origin. The only exception is the Northwest, but that 
works against the idea that a Northern Italian origin makes people, ceteris paribus, less 
attracted by populist redistribution.  
 
Table 3. Linear probability of Petition signature against Chavez, regressed against Italian 
regional dummies and usual covariates.  The three samples chosen to head each column 
follow the definition in the previous section. 
 
 
Although there are concerns about omitted variable bias, some basic checks seem 
reassuring. One of them is that the sign and magnitudes of the income effect seem 
reasonable: as a first approximation, a 1% higher income makes people 0.2% more likely to 
sign a petition against Hugo Chavez in 2004. Similarly, the male coefficient appears 
negative, consistent with the general trend in Venezuela. 
 
So far, this evidence supports neither Hypothesis 1 on propensity for civic engagement, nor 
Hypothesis 2 on redistribution. Overall, there are few differences in the political behavior of 
people coming from different region in Italy.  
 
Formally, we find suggestive evidence that the speed of adaptation, α, is large. To interpret 
the calculated value as an actual speed we need to assume that the differential self selection 
of migrant families is not excessively correlated with the determinants of political behavior 
used in the regression.   If this assumption seems reasonable, then an open question is what 
may be the reasons under this high measured convergence in behavior? One possibility is 
that cultural heritage is transmitted much more strongly when both parents migrate from the 
same culture. In Venezuela, the postwar migration of Italians was very skewed towards 
males (in some years in a ratio of three or four to one). While some of them came back to 
Italy later on, many others married local women, which may have helped speed cultural 
convergence. Another explanation would trace the high speed of convergence to the set of 
opportunities available. As suggested by the framework put forth in section 2, if there is a 
large gap between Southern Italy and Venezuela in terms of the environment, then altruistic 
parents may favor a disporportionally large adaptation vis-à-vis the Northern Italian 
immigrants. 
 
 
Counterarguments, confounding factors and alternative stories. 
 
One potentially confounding factor cited in these cases are differences in human and 
physical capital at the moment of arrival. While it is interesting to explore this possibility, 
the potential dependence on these factors will not impact our conclusion that the average 
culture of a region of origin alone is a poor predictor of political behavior.  
 
Another concern can be that measurement issues create too much noise. If this is correct, 
that could be the cause explaining why we fail to get support for hypothesis 1 and 2. 
Discarding this issue requires a long set of additional analyses that go beyond the current 
paper. However, it is important to note that the precision of our measure is considerably 
higher than that of many alternative exercises in the literature.   On the one hand the 
definition of surname was an exercise to increase precision of origin. Requiring that 70% of 
people with that surname live in a given region focus us on families with low mobility 
within Italy.   On the other hand, if culture is highly persistent, and if this persistence travels 
within the family, then the surname of origin may be a less noisy predictor than the actual 
nationality of origin. For example, a French born with Italian surname living in Venezuela 
may be identified as Italian, which makes sense under the hypothesis that family is the 
channel through which the cultural signal travels.  
 
Additionally, in this paper we have dealt with relevant revealed behavior of Venezuelans in 
a very particular and clear situation and choice set: voting or not circa 2000 and signing a 
petition against Chavez or not in 2004.  If any, these seem better indicators of behavior than 
the stated preference in a long survey with many and not fully clear alternatives (e.g. the 
World Value Survey). Thus, we believe that at least in this dimension we are being more 
precise than what has been standard in the cultural economics literature.  
 
In conclusion, so far we cannot reject that within region self selection of migrants is driving 
our results. However, if one believes in the identification strategy, we can say still say that 
average cultural characteristics of a region of origin seem second order at explaining 
political behavior.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
For how long does cultural heritage persist? Do the culturally inherited values of 
immigrants dilute as generations pass?  To explore these questions we studied the 
relationship between revealed political behavior of immigrant families and the culture of the 
place where they migrated from.   In particular, we attempt to tell apart the more local 
aspects of culture (e.g. Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1983) from other country-to-country fixed 
effects such as religion, language or discrimination by recipient country’s population.  In 
order to achieve this, we focused on emigrants to Venezuela from different regions of Italy 
and used descendants’ surnames to link them to regions of origin.  
 
Prima facie, the well known propensities for civic engagement and against redistribution of 
Northern Italians in comparison to their Southern counterparts do not seem relevant for 
Italians in Venezuela. This can be because of either within-region self-selection of migrants 
or dilution over time of family’s preferences. In any case, our evidence points towards 
average culture at origin as a second order issue for both economic success and political 
behavior. 
 
This measurement paper leaves us with many avenues for future research. A first priority is 
to put bounds on the hypothesis of differential self selection. To do that the authors are 
currently exploring immigration records which contain proxies for wealth and human 
capital at the moment of arrival, which can be compared across regions and with the 
population that remained in Italy in the middle of the XX century.  A second major concern 
is to verify that these results are robust to alternative ways to trace back surnames to 
regions. While the current paper presents some basic checks, there are alternative methods 
which we plan to explore further. The most obvious is moving from a deterministic into a 
stochastic relationship, where surnames will have a probability of belonging to one of 
twenty Italian regions of origin. Although such an approach imposes a higher computational 
burden, it can also increase the sample size by effectively including surnames which are 
prevalent in two or three regions. Third, Venezuelan local politics surely plays a role. In 
practice, using the geographic distribution of voters among Venezuelan states can further 
reduce the variance of our estimates. Finally, since many non –returning male migrants 
married with native Venezuelan women, it may be that part of the rapid convergence can be 
accounted for by intermarriage instead of cultural adaptation of offspring.   
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7. Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. Some notes about surnames 
 
 The mapping of surnames to Italian regions was made with current population. 
As a result, surnames that are highly common or that belong to families that 
had a history of high internal migration within Italy are under-sampled in the 
analysis (the Bayesian updating provided by the additional information of the 
surname changes very little the prior about the region of origin). 
 
 Surnames travel only through fathers, similarly to a genetic locus in the Y-
chromosome. While in both Italy and Latin America people use both father’s 
and mother’s surnames, the only one that passes to the next generation is the 
one held by the grandfathers. In principle, assuming that sex ratios are 
orthogonal to our surnames, this does not seem like a problem for the results. 
Thus, our study so far looks at the effect of having a father with an Italian 
surname. Extending this and exploring heterogeneity is beyond the scope of the 
current paper. 
 
 Due to the Galton-Watson decay process, the surnames that we observe today 
are ones that disproportionally experienced high population growth at some 
point during history, both in Venezuela and in Italy. Our sample is based on 
Darwinian survivors. To interpret our results in a somehow causal way one 
needs to assume that this effect is orthogonal to the variables included in the 
regression. 
 
TABLE 5. Mincer regressions by Italian region of Origin
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
o_nordove‐0.0544*** ‐0.153*** 0.0578 ‐0.0451*** ‐0.134*** 0.0646
[0.0144] [0.0422] [0.0487] [0.0132] [0.0449] [0.0494]
eo_nordes 0.0255 ‐0.109 0.0496 0.0248* ‐0.0853 0.0699
[0.0158] [0.0708] [0.0786] [0.0141] [0.0786] [0.0844]
geo_isole 0.0667*** ‐0.00918 0.0983** 0.0687*** ‐0.00111 0.0998**
[0.0227] [0.0437] [0.0430] [0.0171] [0.0455] [0.0427]
geo_centro 0.104** 0.0778* 0.290*** 0.103*** 0.0805 0.300***
[0.0425] [0.0429] [0.0761] [0.0348] [0.0460] [0.0764]
male 0.00265 0.0265 ‐0.0299
[0.0146] [0.0228] [0.0504]
edad_2004 0.0500*** 0.0514*** 0.0366***
[0.00978] [0.0134] [0.00778]
dad_2004_sq ‐0.000594**0.000627**0.000460**
[0.000116] [0.000162] [0.000104]
Constant 15.42*** 15.52*** 15.43*** 14.44*** 14.52*** 14.76***
[0.0139] [0.0418] [0.0414] [0.192] [0.259] [0.168]
Observation 6068 2542 522 6068 2542 522
N_clust 20 16 17 20 16 17
R‐squared 0.006 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.041 0.036
dard errors in brackets
01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample
 
Table 4. Mincer regressions augmented by Italian region of origin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6. Employment regressions by Italian region of Origin
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
NW ‐0.0287***‐0.0517*** ‐0.106** ‐0.0151* ‐0.0375*** ‐0.0729**
[0.00550] [0.00993] [0.0464] [0.00766] [0.00606] [0.0344]
NE ‐0.00798 0.0208 ‐0.0438 0.00704 0.0314 ‐0.0205
[0.0173] [0.0232] [0.0257] [0.0162] [0.0223] [0.0299]
Islands 0.0104 0.0202* 0.0432*** 0.00261 0.00735 0.0256*
[0.0188] [0.00989] [0.00877] [0.0142] [0.00669] [0.0132]
Center ‐0.0328* ‐0.0669 ‐0.0301 ‐0.0181* ‐0.0598** ‐0.0245
[0.0172] [0.0407] [0.0319] [0.00948] [0.0220] [0.0314]
male ‐0.0361*** ‐0.0261 ‐0.0482
[0.00984] [0.0155] [0.0296]
Age ‐0.00979***‐0.00891***‐0.0156***
[0.00256] [0.00302] [0.00439]
Age^2 1.04E‐05 4.65E‐06 7.15E‐05
[2.36e-05] [2.86e-05] [4.63e-05]
Constant 0.445*** 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.843*** 0.830*** 0.992***
[0.00150] [0.00976] [0.00808] [0.0605] [0.0711] [0.105]
Observations 13287 5515 1097 13287 5515 1097
R‐squared 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.052 0.049 0.059
N_clust 20 18 20 20 18 20
r2_a 0.000679 0.00297 0.00676 0.0519 0.0478 0.0532
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
Sample
 
Table 5. Linear probability regression of employment. 
 
 
AIRES HILLER QUINTANA
APONTE KAMMERER ROSAS 
ARMAS LANZ SCHUSTER 
BLANCA LUIS STEINER 
CABELLO MONCADA STOLL 
CORDERO NAVA UGAS 
CRESPO NAVAS VALDES 
ESTE NIETO VOLCAN 
FINK OCA WINKLER 
FRITSCHER OSIO   
GRUBER PALMAS   
HAFNER POHL   
Table 6. List of surnames eliminated from the list for not coinciding with Italian 
surnames. 
 
